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Workplace Flexibility 2010
Phased Retirement and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Legal Standards and Risks

I. Overview
Under current law there is no definition of “phased retirement.” However,
employers currently devise a variety of ways in which to implement such
programs -- by either allowing critical employees to reduce their schedules rather
than retire or by allowing retired employees to return as independent contractors.
In either case, employers who implement either formal or informal phased
retirement programs must make sure that such programs comply with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
ADEA prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, from discharging, or from
otherwise discriminating against an individual based on age with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1). The term “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” as used in Section 623(a) includes “all employee benefits, including
such benefits provided pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan.” 29
U.S.C. § 630(1).
In addition, under ADEA, an employer may not “limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual‟s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).
ADEA contains various exceptions. For purposes of this memorandum, the most
important exception is the “reasonable factor other than age” exception (RFOA).
Specifically, ADEA allows employment practices “where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f). However,
where an employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the RFOA
defense is unavailable. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c). Whether the differentiation is an
RFOA must be decided “on the basis of all the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding each individual situation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(b). In addition, under
the EEOC regulations, a differentiation based on the average cost of employing
older employees as a group is unlawful except with respect to the very limited
exception for certain employee benefit plans. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f).
ADEA claims are either brought under a theory of disparate treatment (under 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)) or disparate impact (under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)).1

1

ADEA also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for enforcing the
employee‟s ADEA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). This memorandum does not address retaliation
claims in detail.
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This memorandum first outlines the legal requirements for each type of claim. It
then discusses how these requirements might apply to a phased retirement
program and the possible implications for both employers and employees.
II. Claims Under the ADEA
A. Disparate Treatment
1. Legal Standard
Under ADEA, an employer is prohibited from refusing to hire, from discharging,
or from otherwise discriminating against an individual based on age with respect
to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1). When an individual brings a disparate treatment claim, “‟liability
depends on whether the protected trait (under ADEA, age) actually motivated the
employer‟s decision.‟” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
An employee may prove a disparate treatment claim either by direct evidence or
through indirect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Direct evidence of
discrimination is “‟so revealing of discriminatory animus that it is not necessary to
rely on any presumption from the prima facie case to shift the burden of
production.” Embrico v. United States Steel Corp., 404 F.Supp. 2d 802, 818
(E.D. Penn. 2005) (citing Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d
Cir. 1998)).2
The Courts of Appeals “have employed some variant of the framework articulated
in McDonnell Douglas3 to analyze ADEA claims that are based principally on
circumstantial evidence.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141. The McDonnell Douglas
framework establishes an allocation of the burden of production and an order for
the presentation of proof in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases.‟” Reeves, 530
U.S. at 142 (citations omitted). Although the Supreme Court has not squarely
addressed whether this is the applicable standard to use in analyzing
circumstantial evidence in ADEA cases, the Supreme Court in Reeves assumed
(without deciding) that the McDonnell Douglas framework would apply and used
it in that case. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
Under McDonnell Douglas a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that:
2

See also Clansman v. Metro Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an
employer‟s inquiry about the plaintiff‟s retirement plans did not constitute direct evidence of age
discrimination, whereas a comment by a possible decision-maker that the plaintiff should be
th
replaced by a “young chippie” did); Martin v. Bayland Inc., 181 Fed. Appx. 422, 423-24 (5 Cir.
2006) (finding that a supervisor‟s remark that “I think it‟s time to hang it up and for you – for you to
retire” does not constitute direct evidence because although there is a link between retirement
and age, it is not a necessary one).
3
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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1) the plaintiff was a member of the class protected by ADEA (i.e. at least
40 years of age);
2) the plaintiff was otherwise qualified for the position;
3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and
4) the defendant hired a younger individual for the position or treated the
plaintiff adversely relative to a younger employee.4
Embrico, 404 F.Supp 2d at 818 (citing Anderson v. CONRAIL, 297 F.3d 242,
249-50 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Obviously, the legal standard under the first prong is fairly straightforward. A
plaintiff either is or is not age 40 or over.
The second prong requires the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating that
he or she is qualified for the position in question. To do so, the plaintiff needs to
show that he or she “possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the
job. Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001).5
In determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
discrimination, a court must “consider a plaintiff's qualifications independent of
the reasons offered by the employer for an adverse employment action.” Rufo v.
Dave & Buster, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-698, 2005 WL 3454231 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16,
2005) (quoting Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 585 (6th
Cir. 2002)). In other words, an employer may actually have been unhappy with
an employee‟s performance and may bring forward evidence of that fact as the
non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action against the employee. But such
evidence may not be used to rebut the plaintiff‟s prima facie case if the plaintiff
has presented other evidence (such as consistent evaluations stating satisfactory
performance on a job) to show that he or she was qualified for the job. As the 6th
Circuit noted in Cicero, “a court must be careful not to conflate the distinct stages
of the McDonnell Douglas test.” Cicero, 280 F.3d at 585. In that case, the court
concluded that “when viewed independently of [the employer‟s] proffered reason,
Cicero offers sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he was qualified
for his position.” Id. In that case, the evidence consisted of Cicero‟s positive
evaluations and his receipt of merit bonuses. Id. at 585-587.
4

In General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) the employee claimed
that the employer violated the ADEA when it terminated health care benefits for workers under
age 50 but not for those over age 50. The Supreme Court found that discrimination against the
relatively young (even though covered by ADEA) vis-à-vis older workers in the protected class is
outside of the scope of the ADEA.
5
Gregory is a Title VII case. But as the Second Circuit noted in Galaby v. New York City Board
of Educ., 202 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 2000), ADEA and Title VII disparate treatment claims are
analyzed under the same legal framework.
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The third prong of the prima face case requires a plaintiff to prove that he or she
has suffered an “adverse employment action.” An adverse employment action
need not be some “ultimate” action (i.e. firing, failing to promote, etc.), nor is it
limited to simply monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits.6 Rather,
courts take a case–by-case approach, examining the particular factors relevant
to the situation at hand. As the Seventh Circuit has observed:
[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment
must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage
or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly
diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique
to a particular situation.7
Using case-by-case analyses, the following are some examples of actions that
have been held to be adverse employment actions in disparate treatment claims
under the ADEA:






Failure to train.8
Change in status from division manager to sales manager position (even
with the same salary and benefits).9
Transfer, even with the same pay, to a dead-end job that effectively was
eliminated before the transfer.10
A gradual demotion by taking away job responsibilities.11
Downgrade in evaluations.12

Again using such case-by-case analyses, the following are some examples of
actions that have been held not to be adverse employment actions in disparate
treatment claims under the ADEA:


6

Negative performance evaluations, standing alone.13

th

See Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461-62 (6 Cir. 2000); Sanchez v. Denver
th
Pub. Schools, 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10 Cir. 1998)
7
Crady v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993). Some
courts require that the action be a “materially adverse change,” while other do not use that
specific term.
8
Embrico, 404 F.Supp. 2d at 820-21.
th
9
Schram v. Schwan‟s Sales Enterprises, Inc., 124 Fed.Appx. 380, 385-86 (6 Cir. 2005).
d
10
Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 831 n. 7 (3 Cir. 1994).
11
Acevedo Martinez v. Coatings Inc. and Co., 251 F.Supp. 2d 1058, 1068 (D.P.R. 2003).
12
Vernon v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 154 F.Supp. 2d 844, 855 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
13
Johnson, 2000 WL 148480 at *10. See also DeWalt v. Meredith Corp., No. 05-2544-JWL, 2007
WL 1310184,*8 (D. Kan. May 4, 2007)(finding no adverse employment actions where negative
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Regulating the length and time of bathroom breaks.14
Absent changes in salary or the number of hours of work, scheduling
matters.15
Work reassignments without a change in salary or work hours.16
Lateral transfers.17
Not receiving preferred vacation time. 18

Some plaintiffs attempt to show an adverse employment action through a
constructive discharge claim, including a claim of involuntary retirement.
“‟Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes or allows
the employee‟s working conditions to become so intolerable that the employee
has no other choice but to quit.‟” DeWalt v. Meredith Corporation, 2007 WL
1310184 at *9 (quoting MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266,
1281 (10th Cir. 2005)).
The requirement that an employee must have had “no other choice but to quit” is
a high standard. For example, in DeWalt, the district court concluded that a
“rational trier of fact could not conclude, based on the summary judgment record,
that a reasonable employee in plaintiff's position would have felt that he had no
other choice but to quit.” Id. at *10.
In DeWalt, as the court observed, the plaintiff noted that he “saw many
individuals in the protected class harassed, terminated, and generally treated
discriminatorily; that he was transferred to the overnight shift, an entry-level
position, because of his age; that he began receiving write-ups and threatened
termination for petty issues such as failing to clean up after the day shift; and that
his health began to suffer such that both his wife and psychologist recommended
that he quit.” Id. While this evidence, according to the court, reflected the fact
that during the last two years of the plaintiff‟s employment “working conditions for
older workers deteriorated to the point that they were difficult and unpleasant,”
the sole relevant issue was “whether the employer allowed the employee the
opportunity to make a free choice regarding his employment relationship.” Id. at
10 (citing Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004)).
According to the court, the plaintiff “could have continued to work at the station,
even though that option may not have been very appealing to him.” Id.
The key here is the “objective” standard of reasonableness that a court will apply.
As the DeWalt court noted in the beginning of its analysis: “The employees'
subjective views of the situation are irrelevant,” (citing MacKenzie v. City &
memoranda and reprimands were not adverse employment actions where plaintiff‟s responsibility,
pay and benefits remained the same).
14
Johnson, 2000 WL 148480 at *11.
15
Banks v. Principi, 386 F.Supp.2d 921, 927 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
16
Id.
17
McNealy,121 Fed.Appx. at 33-34.
th
18
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9 Cir. 2000).
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County of Denver, 414 F.3d at 1281), “as are the employer's subjective intentions
toward the employee.” (citing Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th
Cir.2005). Id. at *9. Thus, as the court concluded at the end of its analysis, “the
fact that a plaintiff subjectively considers his or her workplace stressful and may
have suffered personal health problems as a result is not an objective criterion
used to determine if a reasonable employee would have been compelled to
resign.” Id. at *10 (citing Exum, 389 F.3d at 1136 n. 7).
The case of Embrico v. United States Steel Corp., 404 F.Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.
Penn. 2005) is also instructive on the facts necessary to demonstrate involuntary
retirement for purposes of the prima facie case. In Embrico, four plaintiffs were
faced with either retiring under their employer‟s voluntary early retirement
program or possibly losing their jobs as a result of a plant closing and its
reconfiguration as a different enterprise.
The court analyzed the fact situations with regard to the four plaintiffs in
significant detail. The court observed that three of the plaintiffs admitted that
none of the senior management gave them an indication either way whether they
would be terminated; rather, they merely believed they would be. The court
found that while the facts showed “uncertainty” about whether their jobs would be
eliminated, that was not enough to show involuntary retirement. Id. at 819-820.
As the court noted, while the facts showed that “a reasonable person in
Embrico‟s position might view resignation as „the wisest or best decision,‟ they
[did] not show that termination was objectively so certain that he had no choice
but retire.” Id. at 820.
Although the court found the fact situation with regard to the fourth plaintiff to be
“close to the line,” id. at 822, it concluded that this plaintiff could make out a
prima facie case of involuntary retirement. The specific testimony cited by the
court was that “younger employees were given trainings from which [this plaintiff]
was excluded; [this plaintiff‟s] latest evaluation had been lowered two points
unexpectedly; his immediate supervisor . . . directly recommended to him that he
accept the [early retirement plan]; and that when he directly confronted [a
manager] about his imminent termination, [the manager] was silent in such a way
that it could reasonably be interpreted as an affirmation.” Id. at 821. Given these
facts, this plaintiff met the prong of demonstrating an adverse employment action
for purposes of the prima facie case.
The final prong of the McDonell Douglas framework requires a showing that the
complaining employee was treated adversely in favor of a younger employee.
The younger employee need not be outside the protected class, provided that the
individual is “substantially younger” than the complaining employee. O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996). Although the Supreme
Court indicated in O‟Connor that a three year difference provided only thin
evidence of discrimination and a sixteen year difference was much more
probative, the Court did not further elucidate the standard for determining what
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constitutes a substantial age difference. Id. at 312. The circuits are split on this
question, and the age difference requirement ranges from three to ten years.19
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to “„produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was
rejected or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason.‟” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Company, 530 U.S. 133, 142 (quoting
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). This is
not a particularly heavy burden. It is “one of production, not persuasion; it „can
involve no credibility assessment.‟” Id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). An employer meets the burden by simply proffering
some explanation for the adverse employment action that was not motivated by
age.
The fact that a criterion used by an employer may empirically correlate with age
will not make that criterion, on its own, an invalid proxy for age. As the Supreme
Court ruled in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), a factor that is
closely correlated with age (in that case, being close to vesting in a pension) is
still distinct from age itself. Id. at 611-612. Thus, an employer who makes an
adverse employment decision on the grounds that an employee is close to
vesting is not basing its decision on invalid stereotypes about age – but rather,
on perhaps accurate assessments of the costs of employees who are close to
vesting. Id. at 612.20
Once an employer meets its burden of producing a legitimate reason other than
age, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff to demonstrate that
age was the reason for the discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citing
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). To do so, the plaintiff “must be afforded the
„opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.‟” Id. The plaintiff can do so by demonstrating that the employer‟s
explanation is not worthy of credence. The plaintiff may also draw on all the
evidence that established his or her prima facie case and any inferences that
19

th

See Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003 (11 Cir.1997)(a three year age
difference is sufficient to make out prima facie case); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533
th
(9 Cir.1981) (a five year age difference combined with evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for
the position was sufficient to make out a prima facie case); Schiltz v. Burlington Northern
th
Railroad, 115 F.3d 1407, 1413 (8 Cir.1997) (a five year age gap is insufficient to give rise to a
d
presumption of discrimination); Barber v. CSX Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 694, 699 (3
Cir.1995) (an eight year age difference satisfied a “sufficiently younger” test); Adkins v. Safeway,
Inc., 985 F.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C.Cir.1993) (an eight year age difference was not sufficient to make
out a prima facie case of age discrimination); Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893
th
(7 Cir. 1997) (a ten year difference in age is presumptively significant, and a plaintiff may make
out a prima facie case with a lesser age gap if the plaintiff can prove that the employer
considered the difference in age to be significant).
20
The Court noted that an employer who fired an employee in order to prevent his or her pension
benefits from vesting would be liable under §510 of ERISA, but not, without more, under the
ADEA. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 612 (1993).
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might properly be drawn from such evidence. Id. at 143-144. Thus, for example,
in the case of Reeves, once the plaintiff sufficiently called into question the
credibility of the employer‟s reasons for his termination (i.e., his failure to properly
keep attendance records), the jury was permitted to find that the employer had
improperly fired the plaintiff for age discrimination – even though the plaintiff had
included no additional evidence beyond the evidence that had established his
prima facie case.
Of course, carrying the burden of persuasion that an employer‟s stated nondiscriminatory reason is not credible and is merely a pretext for discrimination is
not an easy one to meet. For example, the only plaintiff in Embrico who was
found to have stated a prima facie case of discrimination was unable to prove
that the employer‟s non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. The employer in
that case claimed that decisions about which employees to retain were made
based on the employees‟ technical backgrounds, and not based on their age.
Embrico, 404 F.Supp.2d at 824. The court found the plaintiff‟s argument that this
objective on the part of the employer was merely a pretext for age discrimination
to be unpersuasive. Id. at 824-827.
2. Disparate Treatment Standard Applied to Phased Retirement
Programs
Employers today are implementing phased retirement arrangements in a variety
of ways. For example, an employer may permit an individual to reduce his or her
hours worked or to reduce his or her responsibilities. Such an individual may or
may not have access to a portion of his or her pension or retirement benefits
based on the reduction of hours. As an alternative, an employer may implement
a phased retirement program by rehiring select retirees.
Regardless of the form that a phased retirement arrangement may take, surveys
of employers indicate that the reason employers are interested in exploring and
implementing such programs is to retain critical talent based on the employer‟s
business needs.21 At the same time, there may presumably be a number of
21

According to a recent Society for Human Resource Management and AARP report, employers
will need to implement “flexible retirement arrangements,” including phased retirement, for the
following reasons:






Maintaining continuity of essential business operations by retaining key workers
whose positions may be difficult to fill;
Enhancing productivity by addressing the need for work/life balance;
Reducing costs associated with hiring and training new employees;
Increasing organizational flexibility by tapping retirees as consultants or
contractors; and
Forecasting future workforce needs and employee benefit costs.

AARP and Society for Human Resource Management (2006). “Phased Retirement and Flexible
Retirement Arrangements: Strategies for Retaining Skilled Workers” available at
http://www.aarp.org/money/careers/employerresourcecenter/trends/erc_order_form.html.
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employees who may wish to take advantage of a phased retirement
arrangement, if an employer makes such arrangements available to some and if
the laws are otherwise crafted to make such arrangements financially and
logistically easy to take advantage of.22 The employer, of course, may not have
a business need to retain all such employees.
For purposes of analyzing how a disparate treatment claim might arise under
ADEA against an employer who has implemented a phased retirement program,
consider the following hypothetical:
Employee A has worked for Company Z for thirty years. He is 63 years
old and is eligible for full retirement based on his age and years of service.
Company Z has entered into phased retirement arrangements with six
other employees in employee A‟s division of fifty employees. All six of the
employees who have been granted such arrangements are between the
ages of 50 and 54.
Employee A wants to reduce his full-time schedule by one-third so that he
can care for his sick wife. He does not want to fully retire because he
wants to maintain employer provided health care coverage for his wife and
because he needs to earn income to help support his family.
Employee A requests a phased retirement arrangement from Company Z.
The Company denies his request, stating that its business needs would
not be met by Employee A working a 2/3 schedule. Employee A
subsequently retires because he claims he cannot work a full-time
schedule and care for his wife. He then brings suit under the ADEA
claiming that Company Z refused his request for a phased retirement
arrangement solely because of his age.
Based on current case law, Employee A will face two hurdles in establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination.
Obviously, Employee A will not have a difficult time proving that he is a member
of the protected class (i.e. age 40 or over). Furthermore, given that Company Z
has allowed “younger” workers to participate in the phased retirement program,
Employee A will also probably not have difficulty proving the fourth prong of the
prima facie case.
Under the second prong of the prima facie case, however, Employee A must
prove that he is qualified to work a reduced schedule. Given the lack of case law
directly on point, we can only speculate as to what courts might require under
this prong of the prima facie case. One can probably expect, however, that
See Pitt-Catsouphes, M. and Smyer, M., “Older Workers: What Keeps Them Working?” Issue
Brief 1, July 18, 2005, available at http://agingandwork.bc.edu/template_briefs.
22
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plaintiff and management lawyers will differ significantly on what such evidence
must include.
For example, plaintiff lawyers may argue that the sole evidence necessary to
demonstrate that a plaintiff is “qualified” to participate in a phased retirement
program is that the plaintiff‟s position is amenable to a reduced hours schedule
and that the plaintiff is qualified to receive such a schedule. As part of such
evidence, the plaintiff may point to his or her generally good evaluations,
including evidence that there is nothing in the plaintiff‟s record that would call into
doubt his or her ability to meet deadlines, manage time, etc.
Conversely, management lawyers may argue that to be “qualified” to participate
in a phased retirement program, the plaintiff must be similarly situated to other
individuals who were allowed to participate in the phased retirement program in
all respects. In other words, the plaintiff would have to show that she or he has
similar critical skills that the employer wishes to retain, and that allowing the
plaintiff to work a part-time schedule would advance the employer‟s business
needs. Under this definition of “qualified,” Employee A would need to show that
allowing him to work a reduced schedule satisfies the business needs of the
employer. Presumably, given the facts in this example, Employee A would be
unable to do so.
Even if Employee A satisfied the second prong, he would still need to satisfy the
third prong of a prima facie case. Thus, he would have to show that Company
Z‟s denial of his request to work a part-time schedule was an “adverse
employment action.” Again, there is no case law on this issue, but we presume
that plaintiff and management lawyers would differ on whether denial of an
opportunity to work part-time constitutes an adverse employment action.
Plaintiff lawyers most likely would argue that a change from working full-time to
part-time – where an employee‟s income, hours at work, and workload and
responsibilities will differ -- is clearly a material change in the “compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” For example, most people would
probably agree that requiring an employee to reduce his or her hours would be
an adverse employment action. Plaintiff lawyers might argue that denying an
employee the opportunity to reduce his or her hours is similarly an adverse action
in certain circumstances.
Management lawyers, however, would presumably argue that a request to work
part-time is merely a request for a change in schedule, and that in general,
scheduling matters are not “adverse employment actions.”23 But the case-by23

th

See Banks, 386 F.Supp.2d at 927. See also Johnson v. UPS, 117 Fed.Appx. 444, 450 (6 Cir.
2004) (“Case law indicates that, absent changes in salary or the number of hours of work,
scheduling matters would not normally classify as potential adverse employment actions.”) As
this quotation shows, adverse employment action generally also includes a reduction in
compensation by the employer. An employee requesting a part-time rather than full-time
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case analysis used to determine whether a particular employment action is
sufficiently adverse could become relevant in such cases. That is, a plaintiff
might respond that although scheduling changes might not normally constitute
adverse employment actions, the denial of the right to work part-time in certain
unique circumstances does amount to a materially adverse employment action.
For example, the Supreme Court explained in dicta in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006), a Title VII retaliation
case, that “[a] schedule change in an employee‟s work schedule may make little
difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with
school age children.” Id. at 2415. The Court approvingly cited Washington v.
Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Circuit 2005), in which the
Seventh Circuit held that changing a flex-time schedule for an employee with a
disabled child is a materially adverse change. 24
Thus, if Employee A ultimately feels obliged to retire, he could argue that he or
she has been subjected to involuntary retirement. Even if he ultimately did not
retire, he could still argue that – given his or her unique circumstances – the
denial of the part-time schedule was an adverse employment action.
If Employee A is able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Company
Z need only present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its denial. In
almost all cases, it will presumably be easy for an employer to claim that the
particular skill set offered by the plaintiff was not one that the employer felt was
essential to its business needs. Thus, the nondiscriminatory reason for denial of
participation in the phased retirement program will be some factor specific to the
employee, other than the employee‟s age. Employee A would then bear the
ultimate burden of persuasion that the employer‟s stated reason was pretextual
and that Company Z‟s refusal to allow Employee A to work a part-time schedule
was, indeed, based on Employee A‟s age.

schedule, which by its very nature would be a reduction in compensation, does not fit squarely
into the “adverse employment action” jurisprudence for disparate treatment claims. Such claims
normally focus on an employer‟s actions that reduce compensation, not on an employee‟s
request to reduce his or her compensation.
24
th
See also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9 Cir. 2000) (not allowing employees a
flexible work schedule regarding starting times was an adverse employment action under a Title
VII retaliation claim). Of course, Burlington Northern made clear that the scope of an adverse
employment action in a retaliation claim is broader than a substantive claim of discrimination, in
that retaliation claims can reach “beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts
and harms.” Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2414. But plaintiff lawyers could argue that denial
of the opportunity to work part-time is in fact a workplace- or employment-related act, and that the
requirement to consider a plaintiff‟s unique circumstances is equally applicable to disparate
treatment claims.
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B. Disparate Impact
1. Legal Standard
Under a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff challenges a facially neutral
employment practice that has a disproportionate impact on the protected class.25
Disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA, just as they are under
Title VII. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (hereinafter City of
Jackson).26 ADEA disparate impact claims, however, are more strictly
circumscribed – first, by the requirement that “a plaintiff must demonstrate that it
is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created
the disparate impact under attack,” Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490
U.S. 642, 657 (1989),27 and second, by ADEA‟s specific exemption for “otherwise
prohibited” actions that are based on “reasonable factors other than age”
(RFOA). 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
City of Jackson is the seminal case regarding the scope of ADEA disparate
impact liability. In City of Jackson, the Supreme Court held that its decision in
Wards Cove (which interpreted the scope of disparate impact liability under Title
VII) applies to ADEA claims, even though Congress had specifically modified the
Court‟s holding in Wards Cove by amending Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.28 Thus, to make a prima facie disparate impact claim, a plaintiff in an
ADEA case must point to a “specific test, requirement, or practice” that has an
adverse impact on older workers. City of Jackson, at 241. As the Court in City
of Jackson explained:
As we held in Wards Cove, it is not enough to simply allege that there is a
disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized policy that leads to
such an impact. Rather, the employee is “ „responsible for isolating and
identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities.‟ ” Id. at 241 (quoting
Wards Cove and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977
(1988)).
25

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Following passage of the ADEA, most Courts of Appeal had permitted disparate impact claims
under the law. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236-37 (2005). After the Supreme Court‟s decision in
Hazen Paper, however, in which the Court noted in passing that it had no need to decide whether
disparate impact claims were permissible under ADEA, some Courts of Appeal concluded that
the ADEA did not authorize disparate impact claims. Id. at 237. In City of Jackson, the Supreme
Court clarified that disparate impact claims were, in fact, permissible under the Act. Id. at 232241.
27
As explained infra, City of Jackson held that ADEA disparate impact claims are governed by
the standards set forth in Wards Cove. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 240.
28
As amended, Title VII provides that “if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that
the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). In City of Jackson, the Court explained that it chose not to apply this standard
because “[w]hile the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the coverage of Title VII, they did not
amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination.” City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 240.
26
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City of Jackson also held that under ADEA‟s RFOA exemption, if an employer
uses reasonable employment criteria other than age, those criteria will not be
invalidated under the ADEA, even if they have an adverse impact on older
employees or applicants. Id. at 241. The Court distinguished the ADEA
“reasonable factor” test from the Title VII “business necessity” test, explaining:
“Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for
the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a
protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.” Id. at
242-243. See also id. at 267 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting) (“[The RFOA] exemption
requires only that the challenged employment practice be based on a
“reasonable” nonage fact – that is, one that is rationally related to some
legitimate business objective.”)
Applying these two requirements for disparate impact claims, the Court denied
relief to the City of Jackson plaintiffs. The City of Jackson had granted raises to
all police officers and dispatchers based on the City‟s desire to “bring the starting
salaries of police officers up to the regional average.” Id. at 231. Under the plan,
those with less than five years of tenure received proportionally greater raises
when compared to their former pay than those with more seniority. Most of the
officers age 40 and over had more than 5 years of service. Id. at 231.
The Court found fault with the plaintiffs‟ claim on two grounds. First, the Court
observed that the plaintiffs had “done little more than point out that the pay plan
at issue is relatively less generous to older workers than to younger workers.
They have not identified any specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay
plan that has an adverse impact on older workers.” Id. at 241.
Second, even if the plaintiffs had been able to point to a specific test,
requirement or practice that had an adverse impact on older workers, the Court
concluded that the City‟s decision was based on an RFOA. Specifically, the
Court determined that the City had used seniority and rank to determine how
much of a percentage increase to grant because of “the City's perceived need to
raise the salaries of junior officers to make them competitive with comparable
positions in the market.” Id. at 242. The Court concluded that reliance on
seniority and rank was “unquestionably reasonable given the City's goal of
raising employees' salaries to match those in surrounding communities,” and was
“a „reasonable factor other than age‟ that responded to the City's legitimate goal
of retaining police officers.” Id. As the Court explained, “[w]hile there may have
been other reasonable ways for the City to achieve its goals, the one selected
was not unreasonable.” Id. at 243.
Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case in an ADEA disparate impact claim
after City of Jackson, a plaintiff must first “point to both a significant disparate
impact and to a particular policy or practice that caused the disparity.” Pippin v.
Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1200 (10th Cir. 2006).
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After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts
to the defendant to “assert that its neutral policy is based on a reasonable factor
other than age.” Id. The burden then shifts to the employee who, to prevail,
must “persuade the factfinder that the employer‟s asserted basis for the neutral
policy is unreasonable. The test is not whether there were other more narrowly
tailored ways for the employer to achieve its legitimate business goals. Instead,
the employee must show that the method selected was unreasonable.” Id.
(citations omitted).
Since City of Jackson, a number of Courts have decided ADEA disparate impact
claims. All but one of them have been decided in favor of the defendants. The
vast majority of favorable decisions for defendants rest upon the fact that the
employer was able to provide a RFOA for the employment action. The following
are various RFOAs that courts have accepted as legitimate under ADEA, even if
they might have had a disparate impact on older employees:







Retirement status;29
Employee performance, flexibility (whether the employee‟s skills could be
used in other assignments), and criticality of skills;30
Corporate restructuring, performance-based evaluations, retention
decisions based on needed skills and recruiting concerns;31
Technical background;32
Reducing cost by reducing employees with high salaries and high health
care costs;33 and
Seniority.34

To date, only one lower court has found that an ADEA disparate impact case
could not be resolved at the summary judgment stage in favor of the employer. 35
29

Rollins v. Clear Creek Independent School Dist., Civ. Action NO. G-06-081, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82511 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2006) (decided on summary judgment).
30
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 461 F.3d 134, 144-145 (2d Cir. 2006).
th
31
Pippin v. Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1201 (10 Cir. 2006)
(summary judgment affirmed).
32
Embrico, 404 F.Supp. 2d at 830-31 (decided on summary judgment).
33
Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 04-C-563-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11767, *39 (W.D. Wis.
June 13, 2005) (decided on summary judgment).
34
Adams v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., Case No. 2:03cv300, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 662, **23-24
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2007) (decided on summary judgment).
35
EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mo. 2006). In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Lab, see supra n. 30, a jury had found for the plaintiffs on a disparate-impact theory of
liability. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 185 F.Supp.2d 193 (N.D.N.Y.2002). The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury verdict, concluding that “(i) the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case under the ADEA by demonstrating the disparate impact on older workers of the
subjective decision-making involved in the IRIF [involuntary reduction-in-force]; and (ii)
notwithstanding defendants' facially legitimate business justification for the IRIF and its
constituent parts, there was sufficient evidence of an equally effective alternative to the subjective
components of the IRIF to support liability.” Meacham, 461 F.3d at 137, citing Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 71-76 (2d Cir.2004). The Supreme Court vacated the Second
Circuit‟s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of City of Jackson. A divided panel
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In EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mo. 2006), defendant,
Allstate Insurance Co., instituted a reorganization plan on June 30, 2000, under
which it terminated the employment contracts of 6,300 employee-agents. Upon
termination of the contracts, each individual was given one of four options: The
first two options allowed an individual to become an independent contractor, the
third allowed for enhanced severance pay on the condition of signing a release of
claims, and the fourth option allowed for basic severance payments without
signing a release. After the reorganization plan was implemented, in September
2000, defendant implemented a new rehire policy, which provided that former
employee-agents could not apply for rehire for a period of one year after their
termination or after they had received all severance benefits, which precluded
former employee-agents from being rehired in a nonagent position for between
one to two years. Some terminated employees had been rehired before the
implementation of the new rehire policy.
Plaintiffs brought a claim of disparate impact under the ADEA. The district court
found that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination by showing that 90% of the employees who were subject to the
reorganization plan and subsequently barred from rehire were over the age of 40.
Id. at 992. Furthermore, plaintiffs showed that out of the total number of Allstate
employees that were affected by the new rehire policy, 23 percent were over age
40, compared with 2.7 percent of those not within the protected group. Id. at
993. Finally, the court found it persuasive that the average age of employees
subject to the rehire policy was 51.1 as compared with the average age of
Allstate‟s entire workforce which was 39.4. Id.
Allstate provided the following non-age related reasons for its rehire policy:






Avoiding customer confusion and conflict;
Encouraging former employee-agents to participate in an independent
contractor arrangement;
Preventing individuals from receiving severance pay and actual pay
(namely, double-dipping);
Preventing individuals who decided not to continue to work for the entity
from working with those who had; and
Implementing consistent rehiring policies.

Id. at 993.
In response, the plaintiff asserted the following information from the deposition of
the Allstate employee who had developed and implemented the rehire policy to
show that each of these reasons was unreasonable.
of the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to
enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants.
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The individual could not recall involving anyone else in the decision
making process other than in-house counsel before implementing the
policy.
The employee could not recall whether any of the concerns she had with
rehiring former employee-agents (reasons one-four) had actually occurred
during the period between the agents‟ termination and implementation of
the rehire plan.
The employee did not research whether the rehire policy would be
beneficial to Allstate, she did not review any of the reorganization
documents, and she did not make any effort to determine the age
demographics of former employee-agents who would be subject to the
rehire policy.
With respect to encouraging employee-agents to become independent
contractors, the plaintiff showed that such individuals had to decide
whether to become independent contractors three month before the
implementation of the rehire policy.
With respect to “double-dipping”, the plaintiff showed that Allstate already
had a policy in place before the rehire policy to prevent double-dipping.

Id. at 993-94.
The court concluded that the employer had provided evidence on the non-age
related factors it had considered in implementing the rehire policy; that the
plaintiffs had provided evidence that contested either the veracity of those
reasons or the reasonableness of those reasons; and that a reasonable jury
could find that the reasons proffered by the employer for the rehire policy were
not reasonable. The district court thus denied summary judgment for Allstate.36
2. Application to Phased Retirement Programs
To demonstrate how a disparate impact claim regarding a phased retirement
programs might be analyzed, consider the following hypothetical:
Employer X is a chemical engineering company. Employer X has
evaluated its workforce and has realized it is suffering and will continue to
suffer a shortage of qualified chemical engineers. This shortage is due to
the difficulty in finding qualified engineers for entry-level positions and to
the fact that the majority of the company‟s engineers are nearing
retirement age.
To try to retain the engineers who are nearing retirement age, Employer X
establishes a phased retirement program for its chemical engineering job
36

On January 4, 2007, the District Court certified defendant‟s motion for Interlocutory Appeal of
the case. EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 4:04CV01359 ERW, 2007 WL 38675 (E.D.Mo.
Jan. 4, 2007). The latest information on the case may be found at http://www.allstatecase.com/.
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category. Under this program, employees may work reduced schedules,
but maintain eligibility for all employee benefits as if the employee were a
full-time employee. Individuals in the program also have access to certain
of their retirement funds.
To participate in the phased retirement program an individual must satisfy
the following criteria:
1) have at least 20 years of service;
2) be an engineer with skills critical to Employer X‟s mission and
success;
3) have received at least satisfactory performance evaluations for
the past five years; and
4) have approval from his or her manager and the manager‟s direct
supervisor to enter into the program.
Three years after implementing the program, 10 of the company‟s 30
chemical engineers who have at least 20 years of service are participating
in the phased retirement program. Of the 10 individuals, all but one are
under age 60.
Employees A and B both apply to enter into the phased retirement
program. Both their applications are denied, based on their lack of critical
skills and past performance evaluations.
Employee A is 65 and employee B is 66. Employees A and B file suit
claiming that the phased retirement program has a disparate impact on
individuals over age 60, based on the fact that nine out of the ten
employees in the program are under age 60 and those denied
participation in the program are all over age 60.
The first hurdle that plaintiffs in such a case would face is identifying the “specific
test, requirement, or practice” within the phased retirement plan that has the
adverse impact on older workers. After City of Jackson, an assertion that the
phased retirement program, as a whole, has an adverse impact on older workers,
would be insufficient. Presumably, plaintiffs would argue that the neutral policy of
having “skills critical to Employer X‟s mission and success” adversely impacts
older workers in that older workers may not have received sufficient training to
have acquired those skills.
It is unclear whether this argument would satisfy the “specific test, requirement,
or practice” requirement. But even if it did, Employer X could still argue that it
used RFOAs – here, skills critical to its mission and success and satisfactory
performance evaluations – to determine who could participate in its phased
retirement program. And as discussed above, courts have held that factors such
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as criticality of skills,37 performance-based evaluations,38 and technical
background39 satisfy the RFOA exemption. Employees A and B would then have
the very high burden of persuasion of disproving Employer X‟s assertion that it
used an RFOA. Indeed, given that retention of critical talent is almost always the
underlying reason for establishing a phased retirement program, it is difficult to
imagine a situation where an employer could not assert that it used the RFOA of
critical skills in determining who could enter its phased retirement program.
III. Conclusion
In light of changing demographics and labor force patterns, many employers may
begin to expand their efforts to entice employees with critical skills and talent to
remain at their jobs beyond ordinary retirement age. One method for doing so
might be the development and expansion of phased retirement arrangements, in
which older employees reduce their hours of working and are provided some
access to their retirement funds.
The criteria for entering a phased retirement arrangement will presumably be the
employer‟s business needs for a particular employee to remain with the employer
and the suitability of the employee‟s position for reduced hours. This memo,
however, postulates two scenarios in which employees believe the criterion for
receiving permission to enter a phased retirement arrangement was that of age.
As this memo demonstrates, current case law under the ADEA will not make it
easy for an employee to prevail in challenging a denial of access to a phased
retirement arrangement. An employee challenging such a denial under a
disparate treatment framework will face three hurdles. The first two will occur in
establishing the prima facie case. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she
was “qualified” to enter the phased retirement arrangement and that an
employer‟s denial of such a request was an “adverse employment action.”
Assuming a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, an employer will presumably
argue that the basis for receiving permission to enter a phased retirement
arrangement was not age, but rather whether the plaintiff‟s skills were of a kind
that merited the phased retirement arrangement in light of the employer‟s
business needs. The plaintiff would bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that
the employer‟s proffered reason was simply a pretext for age discrimination.
An employee challenging his or her denial of entry into a phased retirement
arrangement under a disparate impact framework will face two hurdles. First, the
plaintiff will need to identify a specific practice within the phased retirement plan
that has an adverse impact on older workers. Second, if the plaintiff is able to do
so, an employer may offer a “reasonable” factor other than age on which the
neutral policy is based. In order to prevail, the plaintiff must persuade the
37

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 461 F.3d 134, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2006).
th
Pippin v. Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1201 (10 Cir. 2006).
39
Embrico, 404 F.Supp. 2d at 830-31.
38
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factfinder that the employer‟s asserted basis for the neutral policy was
unreasonable. The fact that there might have been more narrowly tailored ways
for the employer to have achieved its legitimate business goals will not be
relevant in this analysis.
Although employees might find it difficult to challenge successfully their denial of
access into phased retirement arrangements, such challenges may nonetheless
be brought if employees believe that such denials have been based on age.
Thus, it is possible that fear of ADEA liability – if not ADEA liability itself – might
become a barrier to widespread implementation of phased retirement
arrangements.
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